LPM Corporation v. Paul C. Smith and Sandra A. Smith: Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2005
LPM Corporation v. Paul C. Smith and Sandra A.
Smith: Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Michael R. Johnson; Troy L. Booher; Snell and Wilmer; Attorney for Appellees.
David E. Kingston; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, LPM Corporation v. Smith, No. 20050950 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6086
IN THE UTAH COlftUff OF APPEALS 
LPM CORPORATION, 
A Nevada corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
PAUL C. SMITH and 
SANDRA A. SMITH, 
Alunellate Case No. 20050950-CA 
MkffitvNo. 15 
Defendants and Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM pWAL ORDER 
BY THE HONORABLE GLEN R. DAWSON, 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY, BOUNTIFUL DEPT. 
Michael R. Johnson, Utah Bar No. 7070 
Troy L. Booher, Utah Bar No. 9419 
Snell & WilmerlL.L.P. 
15 West South temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt LaRe City, Utah 84101-1004 
Telephone (Wi 257-1900 
Attorneys for Paul C. Smith and Sandra A. 
Smith 
1 avid E. Kingston, Utah Bar No. 9669 !12 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone (801) 486-1458 
Attorney for LPM Corporation 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
UTAH AP 
JAN' 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LPM CORPORATION, 
A Nevada corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
PAUL C.SMITH and 
SANDRA A. SMITH, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Appellate Case No. 20050950-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM FINAL ORDER 
BY THE HONORABLE GLEN R. DAWSON, 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY, BOUNTIFUL DEPT. 
Michael R. Johnson, Utah Bar No. 7070 
Troy L. Booher, Utah Bar No. 9419 
Snell & WilmerlL.L.P. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt LaKe City, Utah 84101-1004 
Telephone 1801 257-1900 
Attorneys for Paul C. Smith and Sandra A. 
Smith 
David E. Kingston, Utah Bar No. 9669 
3212 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone (801) 486-1458 
Attorney for LPM Corporation 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
I. Nature of the Case 3 
II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial Court 4 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 7 
ARGUMENT 8 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE SMITH'S RULE 12(b)6) 
MOTION TO DISMISS LPM'S COMPLAINT BECAUSE LPM'S FACTUAL 
ALLEGATIONS WERE SUFFICIENT TO STATE A CLAIM OF BOUNDARY BY 
ACQUIESCENCE 8 
A. LPM's Predecessors Acquired Title to the Disputed Parcel Before it was Severed 
from a Larger Parcel 8 
B. Boundary by Acquiescence Can Operate to Take an Entire Separately Platted 
Parcel 13 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY 1) FAILING TO TREAT THE SMITHS' RULE 
12(b)(6) MOTION AS A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN 
MATTERS OUTSIDE THE PLEADINGS WERE PRESENTED, AND 2) FAILING 
TO GIVE LPM A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ALL 
MATERIAL MADE PERTINENT TO SUCH A MOTION BY RULE 56 16 
CONCLUSION-RELIEF SOUGHT 18 
ADDENDUM 19 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Brown v. Peterson Development Company. 622 P.2d 1175 (Utah 1980) 9, 14, 16 
Dahl Investment Co. v. Hughes. 2004 UT App 391,101 P.3d 830 (UT App 2004)12 
Davis v. Rilev. 20 Utah 2.d 325,437 P.2d 453 (Utah 1968) 16 
Holmes v. Judge. 3 Utah 269. 87 P. 1009 (1906) .14 
Jacobs v. Hafen. 917 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1996) 8 
Lane v. Walker. 29 Utah2.d 119, 505 P.2d 1199 (Utah 1973) 10 
Mason v. Loveless. 420 UT App 145, 24 P.3d 997 (UT App 2001). 9, 10, 14, 15, 16 
Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons. Inc.. 2004 UT 101, 104 P.3d 1226 1 
Ramsey v.Hancock. 2003 UT App 319, 79 P.3d 423 1, 13 
RHN Corp. v. Veibell. 2004 UT 60, 96 P.3d 935 (Utah 2004). 2, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 16 
Rvdalch v. Anderson. 37 Utah 99, 107 P. 25 (1910) 12 




UtahR. Civ. Proc. 12(b) 3, 17 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2-
2a(3)(j) (2004). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
ISSUE 1: Whether the trial court erred in granting the Smiths' rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
Standard of Review: "On appeal from a motion to dismiss, the court reviews the facts 
as they are alleged in the Complaint. The court accepts the factual allegations in the 
Complaint as true and considers all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts 
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Ramsey v. Hancock. 2003 UT App 319, 79 
P.3d 423. "A rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is merely a recognition by the trial court that a 
plaintiff's claim is formally deficient; therefore, a motion to dismiss is appropriate only 
where it clearly appears that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under the facts 
alleged or under any state of facts they could prove to support their claim." Sony 
Electronics. Inc. v. Reber. 2004 UT App 420, f 10, 103 P. 3d 186 (citations and 
quotations omitted). A trial court's decision granting a motion to dismiss a complaint 
for failure to state a claim is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness, giving 
no deference to the trial court's ruling. Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons. Inc.. 
2004a UT 101,19, 104 P.3d 1226. 
Preservation of Issue: R. 1-5, R. 23, R.95.6 
ISSUE 2: Whether the trial court erred in finding that the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence cannot, as a matter of law, be applied to obtain title to an entire, 
separately platted parcel of land, when the doctrine could have operated to vest legal 
title in LPM's predecessor before the disputed parcel was severed from the larger 
parcel in the 1960s. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness, 
according the trial court no particular deference. RHN Corp. v. Veibell 2004 UT 60, 
96 P.3d 935, 941 (Utah 2004). 
Preservation of Issue: R. 20-21, R. 28(Exhibit "A" to Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss), R. 95.7-8, R.70(Exhibit presented by 
LPM at oral argument) 
ISSUE 3: Whether the trial court erred by allowing the Smiths to present matters 
outside the pleadings, then failing to treat their motion as one for summary judgment 
and give LPM reasonable opportunity to present all material facts made pertinent to 
such a motion. 
Standard of Review: Same as for Issue 2 
Preservation of Issue: [R 39-43, R 95.10, 95.3(lines 14-15), 95.11 (lines 17-25), 
95.13(linesll-12), 95.15(lines 11-13)] 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Utah R. Civ. Proc. 12(b): 
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are 
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be 
given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by 
Rule 56. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This is a boundary by acquiescence action to quiet title in LPM to a disputed 
parcel of land that LPM and its predecessors have exclusively and continuously 
occupied and farmed for over 60 years. 
LPM Corporation ("LPM") and its predecessors have operated a large farm and 
fruit orchard ("the farm") in Kaysville, Utah for over 60 years. Since at least 1940, the 
farm was bounded on its north boundary by a fence that still stands today. Also since 
1940, the land has been continuously farmed up to this north fence. LPM, its 
predecessors and the Smiths' predecessors have always treated the fence as the north 
boundary line of the property. 
In the 1960s, unbeknownst to LPM's predecessors, the Smiths' predecessors 
created parcel 11 -041 -0006, describing a .39-acre rectangular parcel of land located on 
the farm, just inside (south of) the north fence line ("the disputed parcel"). Thereafter, 
LPM's predecessors continued to farm the land up to the north fence, with no notice 
from anyone disputing their ownership of the parcel. After acquiring the farm from its 
predecessors in 1990, LPM continued to farm the land with no notice from anyone 
claiming to own the disputed parcel. 
On February 28,2005, the Smiths approached LPM seeking to acquire additional 
land to add to their prospective building lot located on the north side of the fence. 
During negotiations, LPM discovered that the Smiths claimed record title to the 
disputed parcel that LPM and its predecessors have occupied and farmed for over 60 
years. LPM also discovered that the Smiths intended to include the disputed parcel in 
their prospective building lot. 
II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial Court 
On April 29, 2005, LPM filed this action to quiet title to the disputed parcel in 
LPM based on the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The Smiths filed a motion to 
dismiss under Utah R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted. No answer to the complaint has been filed. 
In their supporting memorandum, the Smiths argued that the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence did not apply because the doctrine cannot operate to take a 
neighbor's entire parcel. LPM countered that 1) LPM's predecessors acquired title to 
the disputed parcel through boundary by acquiescence before the disputed parcel was 
created, and 2) LPM is not claiming an "entire parcel" because the disputed parcel is 
only a small portion of the Smith's prospective building lot. 
The Smiths replied that LPM alleged new facts outside the pleadings and asked 
the trial court to convert their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a Rule 56 motion for summary 
judgment. The trial court did not convert the motion to one for summary judgment, nor 
did it exclude the new facts alleged. After oral arguments the trial court dismissed 
LPM's complaint on the grounds that the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence cannot 
be used to acquire an entire parcel of land. This appeal follows. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. LPM is the owner of an 88-acre farm and fruit orchard in Kaysville, Utah ("the 
farm"), which it acquired in 1990. [R 21J2, 20] 
2. Since 1940, the farm has been fenced on its north boundary by an existing old 
wire fence ("the north fence") that still stands today. [R 318, R 20] Also since 1940, 
LPM and its predecessors continuously occupied the farm, up to the north fence, and 
continuously used it for farming, livestock grazing and for ingress and egress to and 
from its property. [R 2 f4, R 20] 
3. The Smiths own the property north of the fence. [R 70, R 95.7] 
4. The north fence is a physical boundary marker between the farm and the Smith's 
property to the north. [R 22, R 95.7, 95.9] 
5. At the time the fence was erected, the property to the north of the fence had not 
yet been subdivided and was comparable in size to LPM's 88-acre farm on the south 
side of the fence. [R 95.9] 
6. LPM and its predecessors have always acquiesced to the north fence being the 
north boundary line of the farm property. [R 3 ^9] 
7. The Smiths' predecessors have also always acquiesced to the north fence being 
the boundary line between their property and the farm. [R 3 [^9] 
8. The mutual acquiescence began at least as early as 1940, and was continuous for 
more than 20 years. [R 3 f 10] 
9. In the 1960s, after LPM"s predecessors had satisfied the elements of boundary 
by acquiescence, the Smiths' predecessors recorded a document severing the disputed 
parcel from their larger parcel. [R 2 f3, R 95.3, 95.11, 95.13, 95.15, R 20, 22] 
10. The disputed parcel is about 55 feet wide and 312 feet long [R 70], and is 
located entirely on the LPM farm, just inside (south of) the north fence, such that the 
north boundary line of the disputed parcel runs along a portion of LPM's north fence 
line. [R 2 f3, R 20, 70] 
11. The Smiths claim record title to the disputed parcel, pursuant to a single deed 
describing a single parcel. [R 213, R 95.7-8] 
12. LPM's predecessors continuously occupied and farmed the disputed parcel right 
along with the rest of its property, both before and after the disputed parcel was 
created. Thereafter, LPM also continuously occupied and farmed the disputed parcel. 
[R2t4,R20] 
13. The use and occupation of its property up to the north fence, including the 
disputed parcel, by LPM's predecessors was exclusive of anyone else's use both before 
and after the disputed parcel was created, as was LPM's occupation and use thereafter. 
[R 3 18-10] In addition, all of said use and occupation was also open, notorious and 
adverse under a claim of right. [R 318-10] 
14. The Smiths presented matters outside of the pleadings. In their reply 
memorandum and at the hearing on their Rule 12(b)(6) motion their attorney argued, 
without supporting evidence, that the purpose of the north fence was to serve as a 
barrier rather than a boundary. [R41, 95.3(line 19), 95.10(line 11), 95.15(lines 1-2)]; 
that the Smith's paid all of the taxes on the disputed parcel [R 48,95.11 (lines 14-17), 
95.14(lines 15-16)] and that the disputed parcel was created in 1967. [R 95.3, 95.11, 
95.13,95.15] 
15. The trial court dismissed the complaint, rather than convert the motion to dismiss 
into a motion for summary judgment. [R 67, 78-80] 
16. The trial court did not exclude the matters the Smiths' attorney submitted outside 
the pleadings. Rather, it relied on them in deciding to dismiss LPM's complaint. [R 79] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
LPM is entitled to relief because the elements of boundary by acquiescence were 
met with respect to the disputed parcel, before it was severed from the larger parcel to 
the north in the 1960s. Even if the elements were not met beforehand, they were met 
after the parcel was created because the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence can 
operate to take a separately platted parcel as long as the four required elements are met. 
The court failed to treat the Smiths' motion to dismiss as a motion for summary 
judgment when matters outside the pleadings were presented to the court and not 
excluded. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE SMITH'S RULE 
12(b)6) MOTION TO DISMISS LPM'S COMPLAINT BECAUSE 
LPM'S FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS WERE SUFFICIENT TO STATE 
A CLAIM OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE 
A boundary by acquiescence claim in Utah requires "i) occupation up to a 
visible line marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, (ii) mutual acquiescence in 
the line as a boundary, (iii) for a long period of time, (iv) by adjoining landowners." 
Veibell 2004 UT 60 at 123, 96 P.3d at 941. The Utah Supreme Court held that "a 
long period of time" must be "a period of at least 20 years" for purposes of proving 
boundary by acquiescence. Jacobs v. Hafea 917 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Utah 1996). 
A. LPM's Predecessors Acquired Title to the Disputed Parcel Before it was 
Severed from a Larger Parcel 
Since at least 1940, LPM and its predecessors continuously occupied and used 
the disputed parcel for farming, grazing and for ingress and egress, along with the rest 
of the farm, up to the visible north fence line. [Facts 2, 12, 13] 
Since at least 1940, LPM and its predecessors in interest, and the adjoining 
landowners, the Smiths' predecessor's in interest, all acquiesced in the fence serving as 
the boundary between their respective properties. [Fact 7] The north fence is a physical 
boundary on the north side of the farm. [Fact 4] When the fence was erected, prior to 
1940, the property to the north of the fence had not yet been subdivided and was 
comparable in size to LPM's 88-acre farm on the south side of the fence. [Fact 5] 
The court below struggled to understand how reasonable landowners could 
acquiesce to the fence line as the boundary when it is so far off (55 feet) from the 
presently platted record boundary line. [R 95.8-9] M oreover, the court relied on the fact 
that the disputed parcel is 50 feet wide and several hundred feet long in its dismissal 
order. [R 79] However, that question is not legally relevant to whether the Complaint 
states a valid claim. Utah courts have upheld claims of boundary by acquiescence to 
much larger disputed parcels. See, e.g., Brown v. Peterson Development Company. 
622 P.2d 1175 (Utah 1980), (70 feet wide and 969 feet long); Mason v. Loveless. 420 
UT App 145, |20, 24 P.3d 997,1004 (UT App. 2001) (a 22-acre triangular shaped 
parcel 204 feet wide at its wide end and 9,240 feet long). Veibell. 2004 UT 60 at 
Attached Map of Property, 96 P.3d at Attached Map of Property (a 2-acre triangular 
parcel about 150 feet wide at its wide end and about 600 feet long). 
In this case, considering that the landowners on each side of the fence had such 
large parcels, [Fact 5] the chance that one would be overly concerned about 55 feet is 
slim if it represented only a small fraction of his property. Thus, not only is it apparent 
how the parties' predecessors could have acquiesced in the fence being the boundary 
when it was 55 feet off the true boundary line, but historically Utah courts have upheld 
acquiescence involving large disputed parcels. 
LPM and its predecessors have continuously occupied and used the disputed 
parcel for over sixty years. Their use of the property was exclusive, open, notorious 
and adverse under a claim of right. [Facts 12-13] From at least 1940 to 2005 neither 
the Smith's nor their predecessors ever came forward to say that LPM or its 
predecessors were using their property, or to object to the north fence line serving as 
the boundary, even after the disputed property was created as a separate parcel in the 
1960s, after LPM's predecessors had already acquired legal title through boundary by 
acquiescence. 
"Our settled case law... clearly provides that acquiescence may be established by 
silence." Mason. 420 UT App 145 at f 20,24 P.3d at 1004. In fact, the Utah Supreme 
Court even noted that "[acquiescence' is more nearly synonymous with 'indolence,' or 
'consent by silence'." Lane v. Walker. 29 Utah 2.d 119, 505 P.2d 1199, 1200 (Utah 
1973). Acquiescence may also be shown by the failure of a party to object to the line 
as a boundary. See Veibell. 2004 UT 60, at 125, 96 P.3d at 942. 
The Smith's predecessors allowed their neighbors (LPM's predecessors) 
exclusive use of the disputed parcel. The use was so exclusive that they even failed to 
object to the treatment of the fence as the boundary. Since acquiescence maybe shown 
by silence or the failure to object to a fence as the boundary, LPM's predecessors, 
therefore, acquired title no later than 1960, twenty years after they began occupying 
and using the property to the fence line. 
The fourth element requires the acquiescence to occur between adjoining 
landowners. LPM, as did its predecessors, owns the farm [Fact 2] The Smiths, as did 
their predecessors, own the adjacent disputed parcel. [R 2 f3] The parties who 
acquiesced were, therefore, adjoining landowners. 
If the pleadings left any uncertainty about whether the parties are adjoining 
landowners, it was clarified on the record at the motion hearing. LPM introduced an 
exhibit [R 70] showing clearly that the parties are adjoining landowners. [R. 95.5] 
A boundary by acquiescence, once established, vests legal title of the property in 
the occupier of the property regardless of the record title. Veibell. 2004 UT 60 at ^ [30, 
96 P.3d at 935. "Once adjacent landowners have acquiesced in a boundary for a long 
period of time, the operation of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence is not vitiated 
by a subsequent discovery of the true record boundary by one of the parties." Id. at 
^31, 96 P.3d at 943. It does not vanish just because the record owner conveys the 
property to a grantee who is unaware of the established boundary. See Dahl 
Investment Co. v. Hughes. 2004 UT App. 391, t i l , 101 P.3d 830, 832 (UT App. 
2004); and Rvdalch v. Anderson. 37 Utah 99,107 P. 25,30 (1910). Thus, title gained 
through boundary by acquiescence remains with the occupier, despite subsequent 
conveyances of record title. 
When LPM's predecessors acquired legal title to the disputed parcel in 1960, the 
Smiths' predecessors were simultaneously divested of any legal title they had in it. 
From that point forward, any purported conveyance of title to the disputed parcel by the 
Smiths' predecessors was ineffective, null and void because they had no title to give. 
Legal title to the disputed parcel remained in LPM's predecessors, and was ultimately 
conveyed to LPM. Therefore, even if the Smiths did not know about the established 
boundary by acquiescence, and could not have acquiesced to the north fence being the 
boundary, legal title in the disputed parcel remained with LPM's predecessors and 
subsequently LPM. 
A rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss cannot be granted unless "it clearly appears 
that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under the facts alleged, or under any 
state of facts it could prove to support its claim." Sony Electronics. Inc. v. Reber. 2004 
UT App 420, f 10,103 P. 3d 186 (Utah App. 2004) (citations and quotations omitted) 
(emphasis added). The trial court is required to accept the alleged facts as true, and to 
consider all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts in a light most favorable 
to the plaintiff. See Ramsey v. Hancock. 2003 UT App 319, 79 P.3d 423 (Utah App. 
2003). 
Accepting as true the facts alleged in the complaint, and considering all of the 
reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to LPM, the complaint states a valid 
claim to quiet title through boundary by acquiescence. Therefore, the trial court erred 
when it dismissed LPM's claim for failure to state a claim 
B. Boundary by Acquiescence Can Operate to Take an Entire Separately 
Platted Parcel 
The trial court ruled as a matter of law that the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence cannot be used to acquire an entire, separately platted parcel of land 
when the parcel, and that such a parcel can only be taken if the elements of adverse 
possession are met. [R 78] 
Under basic principles of legal reasoning, if two causes of action are available to 
achieve the same end, just because the elements of one cause of action cannot be met 
does not make the other cause of action unavailable. Each cause of action stands on its 
own merits. If the legal doctrines of boundary by acquiescence and adverse possession 
can each operate to obtain title to a neighbor's land, and the elements of adverse 
possession cannot be met, that fact, does not preclude a cause of action for boundary 
by acquiescence. Whether a boundary by acquiescence can be established depends on 
whether the elements of that claim are established, not whether the elements of adverse 
possession can be met. 
There is no case law supporting the trial court's ruling. The doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence is long established in Utah and has been applied by Utah 
courts for 100 years. See Holmes v. Judge. 3 Utah 269, 87 P.1009, 1014 (1906) 
(applying boundary by acquiescence doctrine for first time in Utah). Nevertheless, 
whether boundary by acquiescence can operate to take an entire, separately platted 
parcel is an undecided issue in Utah. 
To hold boundary by acquiescence cannot operate to take an entire, separately 
platted parcel, would add a new fifth element to the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence. In Utah, boundary by acquiescence has no fifth element. See Veibell, 
2004 UT 60 at f 23,96 P. 3d at 941. There is no requirement that the disputed parcel not 
be an entire separately platted parcel. Such a requirement would be inconsistent with 
the purpose of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, which is to "establish stability 
in boundaries, repose of titles, and the prevention of litigation." Mason. 420 UT App 
145 at [^17, 24 P.3d at 1003. Moreover, an adjoining property owner could always 
avoid boundary by acquiescence by simply deeding the disputed parcel to someone 
else, or by otherwise creating a new separate parcel, as was done here. 
Utah courts have upheld boundary by acquiescence claims to larger disputed 
parcels that contain portions of separately platted parcels. See Brown, 622 P.2d at 1177 
(Plaintiff obtained title to a disputed parcel 70 feet wide and 969 feet long under the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, even though the disputed parcel contained 
portions of three separately platted parcels that defendants held record title to) and 
Mason. 420 UT App 145 at 120, 24 P.3d at 1004 (Plaintiff obtained title to a 22-acre 
triangular shaped disputed parcel that was 204 feet wide at its wide end, even though 
said disputed parcel contained at least parts of six separately platted subdivision lots). 
Thus, the mere fact that a disputed parcel is separately platted and is substantially 
larger than the disputed parcel at issue here does not bar a claim of boundary by 
acquiescence. 
It is unclear from the record exactly why an "entire" parcel should be immune 
from a boundary by acquiescence claim when a partial parcel is not. The Smiths argue 
in their reply memorandum that for boundary by acquiescence to take a neighbor's 
entire parcel, the record owner would have to acquiesce to a boundary that leaves him 
no parcel at all. [R 44] 
However, LPM is not claiming to take the Smiths' entire parcel because the 
Smiths are record owners of the disputed parcel and the property on the north side of 
the north fence, which they purchased together with other property under a single deed 
describing a single parcel. [Fact 11] Thus, the argument fails because if the disputed 
parcel were taken, the Smiths would retain their property north of the fence. 
The Smiths also quote Davis v. Riley, 20 Utah 2.d 325,329,437 P.2d 453,456 
(Utah 1968), in which the Utah Supreme Court stated in a 1968 concurring opinion that 
the "doctrine of boundary by acquiescence cannot be utilized as a subterfuge to avoid 
compliance with the statutory provisions of adverse possession. [R 44] m that case, the 
plaintiff claimed title by boundary by acquiescence to a mere portion of his neighbor's 
parcel, not an entire parcel. See Id. And yet during the 37 years since Davis, numerous 
claims to parcels through boundary by acquiescence have been upheld by Utah Courts. 
See, e.g.. Veibell, 2004 UT 60 at 1J56, 96 P.3d at 948, Mason. 420 UT App 145 at 
|24,24 P.3d at 1005, Brown, 622 P.2d at 1178, Etc. Thus, the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence is still applicable, notwithstanding Justice Callister's statement in Davis. 
In conclusion, even if the disputed parcel were Smiths' entire parcel, the 
elements of boundary by acquiescence were met before the parcel was severed from the 
larger parcel. See point I. A., supra. If boundary by acquiescence was not established 
by LPM's predecessors before the disputed property was severed from the larger 
parcel, the doctrine operated to vest title to the disputed parcel in LPM's predecessors 
even after it was created because the occupation and acquiescence continued through 
2005. [Facts 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13] 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY 1) FAILING TO TREAT THE 
SMITHS' RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION AS A MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT WHEN MATTERS OUTSIDE THE PLEADINGS WERE 
PRESENTED, AND 2) FAILING TO GIVE LPM A REASONABLE 
OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ALL MATERIAL MADE 
PERTINENT TO SUCH A MOTION BY RULE 56. 
If matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the 
court on a 12(b)(6) motion, "the motion shall be treated as one for summary 
judgment.. .and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all 
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." UtahR. Civ. Proc. 12(b) 
(emphasis added). Use of the word "shall" makes the conversion to summary 
judgment mandatory. 
The Smiths presented matters outside of the pleadings. In their reply 
memorandum and at the hearing on their Rule 12(b)(6) motion their attorney argued, 
but did not present any evidence, that the purpose of the north fence was to serve as a 
barrier rather than a boundary; that the Smiths paid all of the taxes on the disputed 
parcel; and that the disputed parcel was created in 1967. [Fact 14] After these new 
matters were presented, LPM made an oral motion at the hearing requesting leave to 
amend its complaint. [R95.17(lines 9-11)] The court denied the request [R 95.17(lines 
12-13)] and dismissed the complaint with prejudice [Fact 15], effectively denying LPM 
any reasonable opportunity to present all materials made pertinent to the motion by 
these new facts. The trial court did not exclude the matters the Smiths presented outside 
the pleadings. Instead, it relied upon them, referencing them in the court's dismissal 
order, even though the Smiths offered no evidentiary support for those matters. [Fact 
16] 
When the Smiths presented the new facts outside the pleadings, the court was 
required by Rule 12(b) to treat the Smiths' motion as one for summary judgment and 
afford LPM an opportunity to present materials made pertinent to the motion. Because 
it failed to do either, the trial court erred. 
CONCLUSION - RELIEF SOUGHT 
LPM asks this Court to reverse the trial court's dismissal of LPM's complaint 
and remand the decision to the trial court on the grounds that the complaint stated a 
valid claim for boundary by acquiescence, or on alternative grounds that LPM was 
denied the opportunity to present materials made pertinent to the 12(b)(6) motion after 
the Smith presented matters outside the pleadings. 
DATED January 4, 2006. 
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PAUL C. SMITH, and individual, and 
SANDRA A. SMITH, an individual, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 050800569 
Honorable Glen R. Dawson 
This matter came before the Court on August 15, 2005, for a hearing on Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss (the "Motion"). At the hearing, David E. Kingston appeared on behalf of 
Plaintiff, and Michael R. Johnson and Troy L. Booher appeared on behalf of Defendants. Prior 
to the hearing, the Court carefully considered the pleadings and papers submitted by the parties 
concerning the Motion. At the hearing, the Court carefully considered the arguments of counsel. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court made its ruling on the record, and the same are 
incorporated herein. 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court rules that Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim 
against Defendants upon which relief can be eranteri anH ttw r>i-:~-^ - plaint should be 
*• ^ ^ n H a n k motiion to dismiss 
dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs Complaint asserts claims for quiet title and boundary by 
acquiescence. Plaintiffs quiet title claim, however, is wholly predicated on its boundary by 
acquiescence claim. Plaintiffs boundary by acquiescence claim fails as a matter of law. 
It is undisputed that Plaintiff is attempting in this action to acquire an entire, separately 
platted parcel of land, that the parcel of land at issue had been separately platted for decades 
prior to the filing of this action, and that this parcel of land is over 50 fifty feet wide and several 
hundred feet long. The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence cannot, as a matter of law, be used 
to acquire an entire, separately platted parcel of land in such circumstances. Rather, in order for 
Plaintiff to obtain title to the parcel of land at issue, Plaintiff must satisfy the elements of adverse 
possession. Plaintiff acknowledged at the heanng that it cannot satisfy the elements of adverse 
possession, because it has not paid the real property taxes on the parcel of land at issue, at least 
since it was created as a separate parcel in 1967. Therefore, Plaintiffs attempt to acquire the 
entire parcel of land fails as a matter of law, and any amendment by Plaintiff to amend its 
Complaint to assert an adverse possession claim would be futile. Based upon the foregoing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss shall be, and it hereby 
s, granted, and that Plaintiffs Complaint shall be, and it hereby is, dismissed with prejudice and 
n the merits, with each party to bear its own attorneys' fees and costs of suit. 
DATED this l ^ d a y of September, 2005. 
B Y ^ E COURT \ 
^Mcfrable Glen R. Dawso# 
Qfstr^t Court Judge ' - // 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 30th day of August, 2005, true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were sent via first-class mail, postage prepaid, to: 
DAVID E. KINGSTON 
3212 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
(801)486-1458 
Attorney for LPM Corporation 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify on January 4, 2006 copies of the above were served by first class mail 
to: 
Michael R. Johnson 
Troy L. Booher 
Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004 
—\at ^_^/_-^^ f^^H 
Attorney for LPM^orrjoration 
